ABSTRACT

The paper aims to examine whether political parties act as self-interested strategic actors, and how the motivation for political finance reform can be explained. In more detail, the paper focuses on the following questions: What motivated and influenced political parties in formulating, designing and adopting political finance regulation?; and, contrary to the rational choice explanation: Why were the instruments that genuinely limit political financing adopted? Although explanations often go along with the Europeanization and conditionality arguments, the article explores the interplay of EU influence and domestic elites and experts. Through the analysis of parliamentary discussions, political financing regulation and relevant reports, informed and complemented with the semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders, the paper suggests that EU influence was crucial for initiating the reform and general regulatory framework. However, the final design and regulatory implementation are a result of interaction among domestic actors and interests – in particular among experts who proposed and drafted the law, MPs and big and small parliamentary parties.